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Abstract
The author of this article draws special attention to two particular claims of 
the free bankers concerning the supposed working characteristics of a 
fractional-reserve free banking system which may strike the reader as 
questionable. The first of these relates to the alleged absence of a real-
balance effect under free banking. The second relates to the free bankers 
reference to Walras Law as providing a rationale for the free banking 
systems “offsetting” actions when confronted with changes in the public s 
demand to hold bank liabilities. This rationale is defective since it is based 
on an erroneous interpretation of Walras Law. The authors conclusion does 
not imply that it is not at all possible, from a rational viewpoint, to make a 
plausible case for this variant of free banking, only that the argument should 
be freed from certain questionable tenets.
JEL Codes: E0, E32, E42, E5, E51, E52
1. Introduction
The central issue in macroeconomic theory is the extent to which the 
economy, or at least its market sectors, may properly be regarded as a self-
regulating system. (Leijonhufvud 1981, 104) While the general belief in the 
superiority of self-regulating, polycentric, market-based economic systems 
had undoubtedly been intensified since the collapse of the former Soviet 
Communist system, now two decades ago, in the field of money and banking
authoritative economists still adopt a radically different stance, and go on 
3developing proposals for what are essentially new variants of central 
planning in monetary matters. (see e.g. Woodford 2003)
While it is today seldom contested that we can rely on self-regulating, 
decentralized, market-based systems as far as the production and allocation 
of commodities in general - such as automobiles, computers etc. – is 
concerned, in the field of money and banking the monocentric 
presupposition still almost universally prevails: in order to function properly 
the monetary and banking system has to be constantly monitored by a 
central agency, viz. by the central bank. A number of economists have 
nevertheless recognized the inconsistency implicit in this special treatment 
of the monetary and banking sectors as contrasted with economic issues in 
general, and have developed models of decentralized monetary and banking
systems which are supposed to function as polycentric, self-regulating 
orders. While the general direction of this branch of research can be 
welcomed with some enthusiasm, the ways in which the  details  of some of 
the better known proposals for  free banking  have been elaborated until 
present, remain subject to a certain amount of well-founded criticism. The 
recent republication by the Ludwig von Mises Institute of Larry Sechrests 
Free Banking (Sechrest 1993) offers an opportunity to draw special attention 
to two particular claims revealed by the argumentation of the free bankers 
which struck this author as rather questionable.1 It is not implied that the 
author agrees will all the other claims and/or analytical conclusions of the 
free bankers.
Any comparative assessment of alternative monetary and banking 
arrangements has to be based on a correct understanding of the 
hypothetical working characteristics of the particular system under 
consideration. For general characterizations of fractional-reserve free 
banking reference is made to the canonical expositions of the theory.2
42. The real-balance effect under free banking –
One of the more remarkable claims made by certain free bankers 
refers to the absence of a real-balance effect under free banking. The real-
balance effect refers to the idea that, for given aggregate nominal money 
holdings, as the price level falls, real money balances increase and, as a 
result, consumer expenditures rise as well. (Sechrest 1993, 26) This 
definition refers to the so-called Pigou effect which was originally thought of 
as working through price deflation. Later writers including Patinkin 
broadened the concept to cover as well a change in the real money supply 
brought about through a change in the nominal money supply or increase in 
prices. (Rabin 2004, 126) It was also Patinkin (1956, 1965) who used the 
label “real-balance effect” to designate the mechanism by which (say) an 
increase in the quantity of money causes an increase in prices, namely 
through its initial effect in increasing the real value of money balances held 
by individuals and consequently increasing their respective demands for 
goods. (see Patinkin 1987, 99) Among the classical economists John Stuart 
Mill already understood how monetary disequilibrium would make prices 
change. (Mill 1844 [2007], 62-4)
It is Wicksell, however, who has been credited for being one of the first 
classical or neoclassical economists who went to the trouble of explicitly 
spelling out just how the quantity of money, interacting with the demand to 
hold it, determines spending and prices. Wicksell pointed out that an excess 
demand for money shows up as a weakening of demand relative to supply on 
the individual markets for goods and services, and an excess supply of 
money shows up as a strengthening of demand relative to supply on these 
individual markets. (Wicksell 1898 [1936] [1965], 39-41) This process is 
therefore called the “Wicksell Process” (not to be confused with “Wicksells 
cumulative process”).
According to what can be considered the best developed variant of 
fractional-reserve free banking, the real-balance effect will be small, if not 
nonexistent, under free banking. As Larry Sechrest explains:
5“In all modern industrial economies, the money supply consists primarily of 
deposits, not banknotes or coins. There is no reason to think matters would 
be appreciably different under free banking. Since competition would compel 
banks to pay interest on deposits, only a fraction of the money supply could 
constitute net wealth. Furthermore, it is even conceivable, though unlikely, 
that interest might be paid on banknotes. Therefore, free banking will exhibit 
a small, or no, real-balance effect.” (Sechrest ibid. 26, also 32) 3
According to this view, what is crucial is whether the money represents net 
wealth, the underlying idea being that any money which bears interest at a 
market rate is not net wealth on the margin, and that any money which does 
not bear such interest is net wealth. (also Laidler 1990, 33) Some authors 
had suggested that money loses its monetary quality to the extent that it 
bears interest. (Pesek and Saving 1967, especially 105-11) 4
Let us now consider the typical scenario which is often discussed by 
free bankers in their attempts to elucidate the micro-foundations of the 
theory of free banking, and which is also supposed to illustrate the self-
regulating capabilities of this kind of system. This is the scenario of a decline 
in velocity, or an increase in its reciprocal, the Cambridge cash balance 
equations “k”, which reduces banks need for reserves. According to the free 
bankers, this brings about a decline in their preferred (or optimal) reserve 
ratios, the money multiplier rises, and the money supply increases so as to 
maintain monetary equilibrium. (Sechrest ibid. 15) In this case, the demand 
for nominal money balances rises as k rises, but the increase in k also 
reduces the marginal liquidity costs of the free banks, since less specie is 
needed to cover adverse interbank clearings, the volume and frequency of 
transactions having declined. This increases the money multiplier and, thus, 
the money supply. In macroterms, the increased demand for money reduces 
aggregate demand (AD), but aggregate demand rises again as the supply of 
money increases. The net result is that neither the price level nor income 
changes. (Sechrest ibid. 28-29) Free banks “passively adjust the supply of 
inside money to changes in the demand for it. They are credit transferers or 
intermediaries, not credit creators.” (Selgin ibid. 82)
6The first point to be stressed is that this scenario is not equivalent to 
the typical Keynesian depression scenario, contrarily to what Sechrest 
contends. This author indeed writes:
“In other words, in the typical Keynesian scenario of a depression in which a 
significant “hoarding” of cash balances occurs (k rises), free banks would 
tend to respond automatically by increasing the money supply so that 
nominal incomes might be maintained.” (ibid. 15)
However, the Keynesian depression scenario is typically accompanied 
by a decrease of the quantity of money. Historically such contractions have 
often been quite severe because of the phenomenon of multiple deposit 
contraction. Such a contraction has been an essential concomitant rather 
than an accidental circumstance in historical depressions. 5
In the scenario here contemplated by the free bankers, the concept of 
an increase of the publics desired holdings of currency (or deposits)
is a money demand concept; it refers to cash-balance holdings, that is to say 
to the fact of not spending money. It does not involve a contraction of the 
quantity of money. 6 In fact it is not quite clear why we would expect the 
scenario of a general rise in the publics desired holdings of currency to arise 
in the real world and why the free bankers devote so much attention to this 
hypothetical scenario as well as to the banking systems supposed reaction 
to it. In the typical depression scenario it is precisely the multiple 
contraction effect that explains - at least partly - the generalized nature of 
the phenomenon, but, as I have pointed out, such a contraction would be 
absent from the scenario envisaged here by the free bankers.
Still the Wicksell Process would be operating. The excess demand for 
cash balance holdings will be reflected in an excess supply of commodities, 
exerting a downward pressure upon prices. It does not follow, however, that 
any offsetting action by the banking system is required or even desirable, 
typically by expanding its liabilities. Any such offsetting action would, rather 
than restore monetary equilibrium, become a new source of monetary 
disequilibrium, setting in motion the Wicksell Process but now in the 
opposite direction, exerting an upward pressure upon prices. It is not clear 
7what difference payment of interest on demand deposits would make as far 
as the operation of the Wicksell Process is concerned. (also Rabin ibid. 122)
In fact the Wicksell Process will operate in both directions in this case, and 
although the net effect may well leave the aggregate price level by and large
unchanged, both movements will produce their effects. It does of course not 
follow from the fact that the aggregate effect of these movements upon the 
price level may leave the latter by and large unchanged that the Wicksell 
Process has not been operating. In fact the Wicksell Process can explain why 
the aggregate price level may remain by and large unchanged in case of an 
increase in the publics desired money holdings which is accommodated by a 
monetary expansion effectuated by the banking system. Nevertheless the 
economic consequences of each of the two movements do not cancel each 
other; they are added. 7
But, as I have pointed out, it should be noted that in the scenario 
envisaged here, the deflationary movement does not involve a change in the 
quantity of money but is merely the effect of an increase in the demand to 
hold cash balances – that is, of not spending them – whereas the inflationary 
movement initiated by the banking system results from an increase of the 
quantity of liabilities issued, which means an increase of the quantity of 
money. Accordingly, the disequilibrating effect of the latter can be expected 
to be more consequential than that of the former.  We can conclude that 
even when it would be considered that the conclusion drawn by the free 
bankers regarding this scenario - namely that the net effect on the general 
price level will be small or even nonexistent – is factually correct, the 
theoretical rationale which is provided for this conclusion is less than 
convincing and in fact not correct. 
3. Free banking and Walras Law
Several prominent advocates of fractional-reserve free banking use 
Walras Law in their attempts to argue for the superiority of free banking. 
After reviewing the various subpropositions subsumed under the label “Says 
Law” 8, Sechrest (1993, 49) concludes:
8“Walras Law cuts to the heart of the matter. If monetary equilibrium (…) 
holds, then there can be no monetary disturbances that might fuel a 
business cycle. The only possible disruptive influence will be real shocks 
that cause temporary disequilibria in specific markets. If monetary 
equilibrium is maintained more or less continuously, then such real shocks 
will have neither pervasive nor lasting effects. Effective demand will tend to 
equal notional demand (micro- and macroeconomic coordination will be 
maximized) as long as the market for money is in equilibrium. Therefore, 
properly understood, Says Law is not (and never was) an unconditional 
proposition, but a conditional one. Given monetary equilibrium, the expected 
value of the difference between effective demand and notional demand 
equals zero.” 9
Horwitz (2000, 86) agrees:
“Says Law finds it most accurate expression when we are in monetary 
equilibrium (see Sechrest 1993: 49ff.). In monetary equilibrium, production 
truly is the source of demand. If there is an excess demand for money, 
production is not the source of demand because some potential productivity 
is not being translated into effective demand. If there is an excess supply of 
money, demand comes not only from previous acts of production, but also 
from being in possession of that excess supply, which may have little to do 
with productivity.” 
It is nevertheless doubtful whether a reference to Walras Law is 
necessary or can even have any significance in view of a justification of free 
banking – or of certain propositions concerning its alleged working 
characteristics - in the sense intended by the free bankers. What is the 
meaning of Walras Law? The particular proposition known as Walrass Law 
is an identity. Lange (1942) gave the name Walrass Law to the following 
proposition, which holds in disequilibrium as well as in equilibrium: the total 
value of quantities of all goods supplied equals the total value of all 
quantities demanded. The term “goods” is inclusive here, covering not only 
9commodities but also labor and other services, securitites and money. 
Quantities are valued at the prices, in money or other numéraire, at which 
transactions are accomplished or attempted as the case may be. If some 
goods are in excess supply and others in excess demand, the excess supply 
and excess demand quantities are equal in total value. Counting excess 
supplies as negative excess demands, the sum of the values of all excess 
demands is identically zero. (Lange, 1942; Patinkin 1965, 73, 229, 258-62, 
and passim, 1987; also Rabin 2004, 82) The foregoing presents one version 
of Walras´s Law, which can be labeled the zero-aggregate-excess-demand-
value version. It implies another, the equation counting version. It states 
that if n goods exist and if supply and demand are in balance for n-1 of 
them, then equilibrium must prevail for the nth good also.10 To the n goods 
correspond n equations expressing the equilibrium conditions that market 
excess demand for each good be zero. Mathematically, only n-1 of these 
simultaneous equations are independent. Consequently, any set of prices 
satisfying any n-1 equations must also necessarily satisfy the remaining 
equation. The Law holds because budget constraints operate and market 
transactions are two-sided. Anyone trying to acquire something is by that 
very token offering something in exchange of equal value at the price 
contemplated. Anyone trying to sell something is demanding something of 
equal value in return. An attempted but frustrated transaction, like a 
successful one, involves two goods and not just one. In a monetary economy, 
one of them is ordinarily money. (Rabin 2004, 83)
For an adequate comprehension of what follows, the following point 
must emphatically be kept in mind when considering Walras´ Law: the
satisfaction of Walras´s Law implies nothing whatever about the satisfaction 
of the general equilibrium condition; neither has general equilibrium any 
bearing on Walras´s Law (Leijonhufvud 1981, 91-92); furthermore Walras´ 
Law has no bearing whatever on the dynamic adjustment properties of any 
economic system. (ibid. 99).11 Thus Walras´ Law has nothing whatsoever to 
do with equilibrium in the various markets, and holds for all price 
configurations. (Becker and Baumol 1952, 356)
10
If for reasons of analytical convenience we simplify matters by 
assuming that there are only three homogeneous groups of goods, viz., 
commodities, bonds, and money, Walras Law may be represented as:
(Md – Ms)  =  (Cs – Cd)  +  (Bs – Bd)                   
where Cd, Bd and Md are the demands for commodities, bonds, and money, 
respectively, and Cs, Bs and Ms the supplies of these goods, respectively.
Since the fractional-reserve free bankers hypothesize a macroeconomic 
model from which a bond market is missing (Sechrest ibid. 25-6), the 
previously provided formula in this instance becomes:
(Md – Ms)  =  (Cs – Cd).
According to this formula, if the market for commodities is in equilibrium, so 
will be the money market, and vice versa. But again such an equilibrium is 
not required in view of Walrass Laws relevance. In particular the 
applicability of Walrass Law does not require or depend upon the presence 
of monetary equilibrium. If a theoretical rationale is required for the 
demand-elasticity of the supply of inside money under free banking, and in 
particular for the accommodation of an increase (decrease) of the publics 
demand to hold bank liabilities through an “offsetting” expansion 
(contraction) of the quantity of bank-issued money (liabilities) effectuated by 
the banking system, then it is unwarranted to suppose or to conclude that 
this rationale is provided by Walrass Law, since Walrass Law implies 
nothing of the sort. It will be obvious to the attentive reader that Walras Law 
is consistent with innumerable possible disequilibria including monetary 
disequilibria. 12
Nevertheless the free bankers could have attempted a different line of 
argumentation, one which does involve Walras s Law. There is a particular 
subset of disequilibria that had been perceived as raising complications for 
Walras Law, and some controversy has arisen in the literature as regards 
the applicability of Walras Law in disequilibria of this sort. In a seminal 
11
contribution Clower had argued that Walrass Law fails in the typical 
Keynesian scenario, and in particular in the depths of a depression. (Clower 
1965 [1984]) 13 Since the Keynesian depression scenario is in at least one
crucial respect analogous to what will typically occur under free banking in 
the redemption run scenario, one might then argue along analogous lines 
that Walrass Law fails to be applicable under free banking when a 
redemption run occurs involving a significant monetary contraction.14
Summarizing, Clower contrasted the behaviour of the representative 
household under the assumption that it regards utility maximization as 
being subject only to the budget constraint – the so-called notional process -
to a situation in which labor services are in excess supply and in which labor 
income is no longer a choice variable which is maximized out, but is instead 
exogenously given. When labor is in excess supply, the effective demand for 
commodities is less than the notional demand. After having presented his 
well-known dual-decision hypothesis, he concluded:
“The point of the example is merely to illustrate that, when income appears 
as an independent variable in the market excess-demand functions - more 
generally, when transactions quantities enter into the definition of these 
functions - traditional price theory ceases to shed any light on the dynamic 
stability of a market economy.” (ibid. 55) 
According to Clower the law thus fails in a depression, which can be 
described as a situation of general deficiency of demand. (also Rabin ibid. 
88)15 Before Clower Patinkin had already analyzed, in the celebrated chapter 
13 of his Money, Interest, and Prices, the situation in which the effective 
demand for labor is smaller than the notional demand when commodities are 
in excess supply. Patinkin presented a theory in which involuntary 
unemployment of labor can arise as a consequence of disequilibrium, in 
particular, excess supply in the market for current output. The essence of 
this theory is causality running from the level of excess supply in the market 
for current output to the state of excess supply in the market for labor. With 
the benefit of hindsight, it is not too difficult to see that the Patinkin and 
12
Clower analyses are essential complements. (see also Barro and Grossman 
1971) 
Although Patinkin had a clear understanding of Clower´s essential 
conclusion that Walras´s Law fails in a depression, in the end he never 
seems to have been convinced by Clower´s argument.16
In our view an essential clarification in this discussion could have 
been accomplished if the discussants had been more explicit about certain 
presuppositions left implicit in the debate. In particular all or most of 
disequilibrium economics considers as the natural context of the discussion 
a monetary regime or a monetary-institutional context characterized by an 
elastic quantity of money, that is, by the possibility for the quantity of money 
to be subject to considerable variations, contractions as well as expansions. 
However, since a monetary regime of this kind, that is, one characterized by 
the elastic nature of the quantity of money, is considered as the obvious and 
natural context for any discussion of monetary matters, the nature of the 
monetary regime that allows for such elasticity is not in itself conceived of as 
part of what constitutes the very problem, that is to say as one of the very 
determining factors of monetary disequilibria and their often detrimental 
effects, let alone as the single most important determining causal factor of 
monetary disequilibria and their harmful effects. A crucial fact is thus hardly 
given sufficient emphasis.17
It should always be reminded that classical authors like Say didn´t 
contemplate the scenario of, say, the sudden disappearance of a significant 
part of the quantity of money or of a collapse (or contraction) of the money 
supply. To the contrary, classical authors seem to have assumed as the 
natural context of the discussion a competitive banking system that would 
never allow an unsatisfied demand for money to turn into a general 
oversupply of all real goods. (Glasner 1989, 60-63) 18
This neglect in contemporary disequilibrium economics would of 
course be less reason for concern if it were possible to consider the actually 
existing monetary institutions as the outcome of a natural development, for 
which no theoretical alternatives are rationally conceivable. In the present 
writer´ s view it is doubtful whether fractional-reserve free banking 
13
constitutes a satisfactory alternative in view of the rather unsatisfactory 
state of the free bankers argumentation concerning the ways in which the 
system would cope with possible redemption runs and monetary 
contractions. 19
4. Conclusion
I have drawn special attention to two particular claims of the free 
bankers concerning the supposed working characteristics of a fractional-
reserve free banking system which may strike the reader as questionable.
The first of these relates to the alleged absence of a real-balance effect under 
free banking. The second relates to the free bankers reference to Walras 
Law as providing a rationale for the free banking systems “offsetting” actions 
when confronted with changes in the public s demand to hold bank 
liabilities. This rationale is defective since it is based on an erroneous 
interpretation of Walras Law. My conclusion does not imply that it is not at 
all possible, from a rational viewpoint, to make a plausible case for this 
variant of free banking, only that the argument should be freed from certain
questionable tenets.
Notes
1 I am thus following up on my (2006).
2 See, besides Sechrest (1993), Horwitz (2000), White (1984 [1995]), (1989), 
and (1999, Chapter 3), and, of course, Selgin (1988).
3 It will be noted, however, that Selgin (1988, 101-2) recognizes the existence 
of a real-balance effect in the hypothesis of a general increase in productive 
efficiency. This author summarizes the workings of a free banking system as 
follows: “Free banks maintain constant the supply of inside money 
multiplied by its income velocity of circulation. They are credit intermediaries 
only, and cause no true inflation, deflation, or forced savings.” (ibid. 102) 
The sequence of adjustment in this hypothesis should thus be: increased 
14
output, reduced prices, real-balance effect, and contraction of the nominal 
money supply. (ibid. 101)
4 At first it had been thought that if there were no outside money in 
circulation, then there would be no real-balance effect. (Patinkin 1965, 297) 
Later this view was abandoned and it was assumed that the inside-outside 
contrast was not the determining factor.
5 As is well known, these issues have been given adequate attention more 
emphatically in monetarist writings. With respect to the 1929-33 contraction 
Friedman and Schwartz clearly recognized the fact that “(…) it is hardly 
conceivable that money income could have declined by over one-half and 
prices by over one-third in the course of four years if there had been no 
decline in the stock of money.” (1993, 301; see also 684-5) Reference must in 
this context also be made to the writings of Clark Warburton.  See 
Warburton (1966) especially Chapters 5-7.
6 This scenario must be contrasted with the kind of scenario that occurred 
when Americans fled from bank deposits into currency in 1929-33, and were 
thus acting to shift into what they considered a safer form of money. The 
unintended consequence was that the money supply fell as banks lost 
reserves. A redemption run under free banking, however, would of course 
lead to a smaller nominal inside money supply, that is to say, to a 
contraction of the quantity of money in circulation. (Sechrest ibid. 35) It is 
important, however, not to confuse the latter scenario with the scenario 
envisaged in the main text. See also Horwitz (2000, 217) who writes: “Of 
course, should customers in a free banking system choose to hold more of 
the reserve commodity, then this would have the same effect as increased 
currency holdings under central banking.”
7 As Ludwig von Mises wrote: “Each change in the money relation takes its 
own course and produces its own particular effects. If an inflationary 
movement and a deflationary one occur at the same time or if an inflation is 
temporally followed by a deflation in such a way that prices finally are not 
very much changed, the social consequences of each of the two movements 
do not cancel each other. To the social consequences of an inflation those of 
a deflation are added. There is no reason to assume that all or even most of 
15
those favored by one movement will be hurt by the second one, or vice 
versa.” (1949 [1963], 417-8)  
8 For the various forms of Says Law – Says Identity, Walras Law, and Says 
Equality – see also Sowell (1972, 34-6).
9 The necessary – but not sufficient – condition in order to avoid business 
cycles is monetary equilibrium. Monetary equilibrium occurs when the 
supply of money equals the demand for money, given the underlying state of 
general productivity and the concomitant price level. Aggregate nominal 
money balances would remain constant in the face of either a change in the 
composition of money demand or a change in productivity. Money balances 
would vary inversely with changes in moneys income velocity, however. 
(ibid. 46)
10 Lange notes that this is the version of the Law proved by Walras himself. 
See Lange (1942, 51n).
11 For reasons that are not entirely clear, Leijonhufvud and Clower propose a 
terminological innovation and designate Walras Law as Says Principle. See 
Leijonhufvud (1981, Chapter 5, 79-101); Clower (1986, Chapter 12, 145-65). 
12 Suppose that with respect to the planning period concerned market 
participants plan to reduce their spending on commodities by ∆C and that 
they plan to increase their holdings of cash balances by an amount of ∆M. 
Then we have:
([Md + ∆M] – Ms)  =  (Cs – [Cd – ∆C ])
Consequently as long as ∆C = ∆M the equality still holds and it is not clear in 
what sense complications are raised for Walrass Law in this instance.
While I agree with Yeager and Rabin (1997) and Rabin (2004) that 
transactions-flow equilibrium and disequilibrium are what are fundamental 
to Walrass law, I do not intend here to enter into any discussion of the 
“stock-flow problem”.
13 Clower was quite clear about his intentions as he wrote:
“(…) either Walras law is incompatible with Keynesian economics, or Keynes 
had nothing fundamentally new to add to orthodox economic theory.” (ibid. 
16
41) Building upon the pioneering efforts of Clower and Patinkin (see further), 
the general disequilibrium approach to macro-analysis was developed by 
Barro and Grossman (1971, 1976). There can be no doubt that the 
disequilibrium economics, developed in particular by Barro and Grossman 
(1971, 1976) following the pioneering work of Patinkin (1956, 1965) and 
Clower (1965), has in unprecedented ways improved our understanding of 
the nature and the consequences of monetary disequilibrium under 
prevailing monetary arrangements.
14 See also footnote 6. However, and depending upon how one conceives of 
the working characteristics of free banking, this line of argumentation would 
expose a weakness in the argument in favour of fractional-reserve free 
banking, which may perhaps explain partly why it was not actually taken by 
the free bankers. The redemption run scenario is not the sequence of events 
which the free bankers have in mind when they praise the demand-elasticity 
of the supply of inside money as one of the main virtues of fractional-reserve 
free banking, illustrating the self-regulating capabilities of their preferred 
system. With respect to this latter scenario, the free bankers have presented 
an elaborate argument involving a model in which the first-order conditions 
for profit maximization by the issuing bank are formally derived using the 
Lagrangean method. (see e.g. White  1999, Chapter 3) This argument is 
intended to convince the reader of the self-regulating, self-corrective and 
self-stabilizing qualities of a fractional-reserve free banking system. As if by 
an invisible hand, the banks are collectively driven to ensure monetary 
equilibrium, while all the time maximizing profits from the standpoint of 
each individual bank. In particular since under free banking there is no 
central bank which can intervene as a lender of last resort, one would expect 
the free bankers to present an equally elaborate argument establishing the 
self-regulating capabilities of the free banking system for the – quite different 
- scenario of a redemption run which, from the perspective adopted here, is 
the really relevant case. However, with respect to the deflationary scenario of 
a possible redemption run, the argumentation of the free bankers regarding 
the self-stabilizing nature of free banking is somewhat less convincing. In 
fact any formal argument is missing. The free bankers have mostly merely 
17
pointed out that this scenario is simply very unlikely to happen under free 
banking. As Sechrest typically writes (ibid. 43):
“Since free banks would have a profit incentive to maintain redeemability 
and to nurture consumer confidence in that redeemability, it seems unlikely 
that redemption runs would occur with any frequency in a free banking 
regime.” As I have pointed out elsewhere, this argument cannot really 
convince. (see van den Hauwe 2006, 171 ff.) One the other hand one could 
argue that since credit expansion would tend to remain limited under free 
banking, the scope for monetary contraction following massive redemption 
demands would be limited too. Everything depends upon how one conceives 
of the functioning characteristics of free banking in this respect.
15 This point seems to be contested by Rabin (ibid. 89) who writes: “Such a 
dismissal of Walras Law would overlook the requirement that only demands 
and supplies and imbalances having the same degree of effectiveness be 
evaluated and compared.” According to Rabin “(…) constrained or effective 
quantities are what are relevant to the Law.” (ibid. 98) Walrass Law as 
conceived by Clower, however, refers only to purchase and sale intentions; it 
asserts absolutely nothing about the possibility of their realization. (see also 
Leijonhufvud, ibid. 89) In other words, Walras Law refers to notional supply 
and demand. Therefore Clowers conclusion was that although Walrass Law 
may be true ex ante, it will not be true ex post in any situation where 
“contrary to the findings of traditional theory, excess demand may fail to 
appear anywhere in the economy under conditions of less than full 
employment.” (ibid. 53)
16 See Patinkin (1987, 867). On the controversy between Clower and Patinkin 
see also Rubin (2005).
17 In fact, it can be shown that in a fractional-reserve banking system 
recurring deflationary tendencies can be expected to be generated 
endogenously. Huerta de Soto (2006)  and van den Hauwe (2005, section 
III.8 - 434 ff.).
18 See in particular Say (1836 [2001], 134) and Glasner (1989 [2005], 62).
19 Two other proposals which may seem more satisfactory concern a 100% 
reserve commodity standard (e.g. Huerta de Soto 2006) and the system 
18
proposed by Prof. Yeager. (see e.g. Greenfield and Yeager 1983) A discussion 
of these proposals falls outside the scope of this paper.
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